MEMÓRIA, DEFICIÊNCIA COGNITIVA E DECISÃO JUDICIAL: RECONSIDERANDO O TESTEMUNHO NA DEMÊNCIA DO TIPO ALZHEIMER

Abstract

 This article discusses the reliability of testimony from people with Alzheimer’s disease. It points out the inadequacy of the presumption that someone afflicted with this dementia cannot significantly contribute to the knowledge of facts relevant to a judicial process. This argument is developed in three parts. In the first, we present the notion of ableism and explain how it negatively affects evidentiary reasoning, leading to testimonial injustices. In the second, we explain Alzheimer’s as a progressive condition with significant interindividual variability and different phases, with periods when memory is still capable of contributing to the search for truth. In the third, we argue that such testimony can not only fulfill epistemic needs, but also that its admission is compatible with various commitments inherent in judicial evidentiary reasoning. We employed the method of bibliographic review of writings on disability and the epistemology of judicial evidence.

KEYWORDS: Memory. Testimony. Alzheimer’s. Judicial decision-making.