THE AXIOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN EUROPEAN CASE LAW: TOWARDS A STRUCTURING OF INTERPRETATIVE FOUNDATIONS

Abstract

This article offers a thorough analysis of the interpretative function of the European Court of Human Rights in the face of an increas­ing axiological imperative. It argues that, while Strasbourg case law frequently invokes fundamental values (dignity, pluralism, au­tonomy, equality), it remains marked by a lack of normative structure. This axiological indeterminacy undermines the clarity, predict­ability, and legitimacy of the Court’s deci­sions, particularly in sensitive societal cases. The author calls for a systematic articulation of the Convention’s axiological foundations, proposing to elevate the notion of a “demo­cratic society” to a structuring principle and to embrace an explicit normative function, in the spirit of the Inter-American and UN human rights systems. Such a normalization of core values would enhance the Court’s hermeneuti­cal authority, clarify the scope of the margin of appreciation, ensure interpretative coher­ence across rights, and facilitate national ac­ceptance of its rulings. In doing so, the Court would reaffirm its role as the common guaran­tor of fundamental rights in an era of growing normative contestation.

KEYWORDS: European Court of Human Rights. Axiological interpretation. Human dignity. Democratic society. Pluralism.