DOLO COMO VONTADE? UMA DEFESA DO DOLO COMO REPRESENTAÇÃO - DOI: 10.12818/P.0304-2340.2023v83p141

Abstract

The line separating dolus eventualis, as the
weaker form of intent, from culpa is a central
issue within Criminal Law. In the praxis
of Criminal Law, the distinction between
each of these mens rea elements has an
extraordinary importance. The motivation
for working with this subject came from the
tension between two different perspectives.
One group of voluntaristic oriented authors
base their distinction upon a volition. On
the other side, there are authors who take a
cognitivistic approach, drawing the line upon
the representation of the perpetrator. In order
to bring up an efficient debate, this article
discusses the structure of dolus and after
showing the unsustainability of a volitional
concept of dolus, a cognitive proposal of dolus
is presented.