AS MEDIDAS RETALIATÓRIAS COMO MECANISMOS DE INDUÇÃO AO CUMPRIMENTO DO DIREITO DA OMC À LUZ DAS TEORIAS DAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS | DOI: 10.12818/P.0304-2340.2018v73p251

Autores

  • Fernando Lopes Ferraz Elias

Resumo

No âmbito da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), a adjudicação compulsória das controvérsias, com a aplicação interestatal de medidas retaliatórias autorizadas pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC), transcende a tradicional lógica dos instrumentos jurídicos internacionais de indução à conformidade. Na literatura, há uma carência de pesquisa acadêmica, teórica e empírica, sobre o cumprimento estatal das decisões dos regimes jurídicos internacionais. Especificamente, são poucos os trabalhos, a partir das teorias das relações internacionais, a respeito da retaliação como mecanismo de indução ao cumprimento do direito da OMC, não obstante tratar-se de relevante tema de investigação. A retaliação nas disputas comerciais internacionais, motivada por decisões políticas e capaz de gerar impactos econômicos, somente pode ser compreendida em toda a sua plenitude mediante ferramentas metodológicas interdisciplinares. Dessa forma, utilizou-se a interdisciplinaridade entre as relações internacionais e o direito internacional como método de pesquisa, que combina trabalhos empíricos com a revisão da literatura das teorias das relações internacionais, apesar das dificuldades de se estudar vários campos de pesquisa ao mesmo tempo. Auferiu-se a incapacidade dos mecanismos retaliatórios de induzirem o cumprimento do direito da OMC por parte dos Estados poderosos (realismo). Num cálculo de custo e benefício, a partir de interesses racionais e individuais dos Estados, as contramedidas incentivaram, na verdade, o descumprimento das decisões do OSC (institucionalismo). Ademais, os interesses de influentes grupos domésticos, escamoteados por questões de grande impacto nacional, pressionaram os Estados a manterem seus comportamentos violadores (liberalismo). Por fim, remanesceu a percepção interna de ilegitimidade das decisões do OSC, levando os Estados a decidirem pelo descumprimento (construtivismo).



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Publicado

2018-12-20

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